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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE PROCESS AND PLEA BARGAINING
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)
In Bordenkircher v. Hayes,' the Supreme Court held
that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment is not violated when a state prosecutor
carries out a threat made during plea negotiations
.to have the accused reindicted on more serious
charges if he does not plead guilty to the offense
with which he was originally charged. This holding
signals the expansion of the prosecutor's legitimate
leverage in the plea bargaining situation. However,
the availability of such leverage may, in the long
run, prove advantageous to defendants since it will
encourage prosecutors to bring their initial charges
at a lower level than they might otherwise have
done. This shift in the prosecutor's preferred strat-
egy will, in turn, have the effect of narrowing the
defendant's uncertainty about the lower bounds of
the prosecutor's offer and thus of providing the
defendant with a clearer idea of the parameters of
the plea bargain.
I
In January, 1973, Lewis Hayes was indicted by
a Fayette County, Kentucky grand jury for forgery
of a check in the amount of $88.30. He was charged
with uttering a forged instrument, an offense then
2carrying a penalty of two to ten years in prison.
During a pretrial conference at which Hayes, his
retained counsel and the state prosecutor were
present, the issue of a possible plea agreement was
discussed. The prosecutor proposed that if Hayes
would plead guilty to the indictment he would
recommend a five-year sentence. Alternatively, if
Hayes did not plead guilty, the prosecutor an-
nounced his intention to return to the grand jury
to seek further indictment based upon Hayes' two
prior felony convictions.3 These convictions made
'434 U.S. 357 (1978).
2 Ky. REV. STAT. § 434.130 (repealed 1974).
3The prosecutor's own characterization of the plea
offer is informative. Ins cross-examining Hayes at trial he
asked:
Isn't it a fact that I told you at that time (the initial
bargaining session) -that if you did not intend to
plead guilty to five years for this charge and ... save
the court the inconvenience and necessity of a trial
and taking up this time that I intended to return to
the grand jury and ask them to indict you based
upon these prior felony convictions?
434 U.S. at 358 n.I.
Hayes subject to prosecution under the Kentucky
Habitual Criminal Act, then Ky. REV. STAT. §
431.190 (repealed 1975). This is a recidivism statute
with a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment for.
any person convicted a third time of felony.4 Hayes
refused to plead guilty and insisted on receiving a
full trial. The prosecutor thereupon returned to the
grand jury and obtained an indictment charging
Hayes under the Habitual Criminal Act.
At trial, a jury found Hayes guilty on the prin-
cipal charge of uttering a forged instrument and,
in a separate proceeding, found that he had twice
before been convicted of felonies. Hayes was there-
fore sentenced to a life term in the penitentiary as
required by the habitual offender statute. Follow-
ing his defeat in the Kentucky courts,s Hayes pe-
titioned the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky for a writ of habeas
"The statute in effect at the time of Hayes' trial
provided that "[ainy person convicted a ... third time of
felony ... shall be confined in the penitentiary during
his life." Ky. REv. STAT. § 431.190 (repealed 1975). In
1977, the Kentucky legislature enacted a new statute,
Ky. Rav. STAT. § 532.080 (1977 Supp.), which was
intended to limit the sweeping applicability of the earlier
statute. Under the new statute, Hayes would have been
subject to a maximum indeterminate term of 10 to 20
years. Ky. REV. STAT. § 532.080(6)(b). Moreover, the
conditions adopted in the new statute to limit its breadth
would have precluded its use in Hayes' case. Under the
new statute, a previous conviction cannot form the basis
for a recidivist charge unless "a prison term of one year
or more was imposed, the sentence or probation was
completed within five years of the present offense, and
the offender was over the age of 18 when the offense was
committed. At least one of Hayes' prior convictions did
not meet these conditions."434 U.S. 359 n. 2. Hayes' first
conviction occurred in 1961 when he was 17 years old.
At that time Hayes pleaded guilty to a charge of detain-
ing a female, a lesser included offense of rape, and served
five years in the state reformatory for the offense. In 1970,
Hayes was convicted of robbery. He was sentenced to five
years imprisonment, but was released on probation im-
mediately. Id. at 359 n.3.
s In an unpublished opinion, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals upheld the prosecutor's plea offer and his deci-
sion to indict Hayes under the habitual offender statute
as a legitimate use of available leverage in the plea
bargaining context. It thus rejected Hayes' objections to
his increased sentence and held that given his previous
felony record, there was no constitutional infirmity in
imposing a life sentence with the possibility of parole. See
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 359.
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corpus challenging the constitutionality of the en-
hanced sentence. The district court denied the writ
and held that there had been no constitutional
violation in the sentence or the indictment proce-
dure.
6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed 7 It held that it is a violation of
due process to place a defendant in fear of retalia-
tory action for insisting on his constitutional right
to stand trial.8 Thus the circuit court, while rec-
ognizing the prosecutor's right to offer a defendant
concessions relating to prosecution under an exist-
ing indictment, held that a prosecutor may not
threaten a defendant with the consequence that
more severe charges may be brought if he insists
on going to trial.9 The crux of the distinction
between these two situations is the potential for
impermissible prosecutorial vindictiveness which
exists in the latter. It is this element of vindictive-
ness which the Sixth Circuit found to be offensive
to principles of due process.'0
The Supreme Court granted certiorari" "to con-
sider a constitutional question of importance in the
administration of criminal justice."' 2 In a five to
four decision, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit
and held that there is no due process violation
when a prosecutor carries out a threat, made dur-
ing plea negotiations, to reindict the accused on
more serious charges if he does not plead guilty to
the offense with which he was originally charged.1
3
Writing for the majority,14 Justice Stewart
sought to downplay the element of prosecutorial
vindictiveness on which the court of appeals had
relied, by emphasizing the "give-and-take negoti-
ation" between prosecutor and defendant which is
characteristic of the plea bargaining situation.
Thus in a sweeping statement which suggests that
Bordenkircher may signal the beginning of a trend
toward Supreme Court tolerance of even greater
prosecutorial advantage in the plea bargaining
situation than has traditionally existed, the Court
held that "in the'give-and-take' ofplea bargaining,
there is no... element of punishment or retaliation
so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the
"The opinion of the District Court is unreported. See
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360 n.4.




"429 U.S. 888 (1976).
12434 U.S. at 360.
"Id at 365.
"The majority included Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White, Rehnquist, and Stevens.
prosecution's offer."' 5 While recognizing that offers
such as the one made to Hayes may deter the
exercise of legal trial rights, the Court argued that
such a deterrent effect presents no constitutional
infirmity. The Court distinguished Bordenkircher
from situations which create some danger that the
State might be retaliating against the accused for
lawfully attacking his conviction, and argued that
it is-only in the latter that a due process violation
arises.
16
In buttressing his argument that Bordenkircher
does not present a situation in which a prosecutor
retaliates against a defendant by bringing more
serious charges after plea negotiations have failed,
Stewart pointed to the fact that Hayes was given
"notice" of the prosecutor's intent at the plea bar-
gaining session. Thus, he argued, the case would
have been no different if the grand jury had in-
dicted Hayes as a recidivist from the outset and the
prosecutor had offered to drop that charge as part
of the plea bargain. 7
.This characterization of the prosecutor's conduct
as reflecting not vindictiveness, but the "simple
reality that the prosecutor's interest at the bargain-
ing table is to persuade the defendant to forego his
right to plead not guilty,"' 8 was not, however,
unanimously accepted by other members of the
Court. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, 9 argued that
vindictiveness was present in Bordenkircher to the
same degree as it had been in earlier cases in which
constitutional violations had been found. Black-
mun also rejected the majority's equation of the
situation in Bordenkircher with one in which the
recidivist charge had been brought in the original
indictment. While acknowledging that the conse-
quence of holding the prosecutor's conduct in Bor-
35434 U.S. at 363.
'6 Prosecutorial vindictiveness against a defendant for
having successfully attacked his first conviction was held
unconstitutional in North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S.
711, 725 (1969). In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21,
28-29 (1974), the Court further held that the "apprehen-.
sion" that the state will retaliate by increasing the charges
if the defendant pursues his right to appeal is sufficient
to constitute a due process violation.
"7 It seems a questionable characterization of the facts
to interpret as "notice" what must have appeared to
Hayes at the time to be a coercive threat. It is clear, as
Stewart recognized, that the prosecutor's intention was
not to give notice, but rather, to induce the defendant to
plead guilty. Yet, Stewart insisted that the prosecutor did
not act vindictively. The viability of this characterization
will be discussed more fully in section IH, infra.
is 434 U.S. it 364.
"Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in Blackmun's
dissent.
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denkircher invalid might be to encourage prosecutors
to bring heavier charges initially, he nevertheless
advanced several arguments in favor of holding the
prosecution to its initial charge. First, he pointed
to the socially desirable objective of keeping charg-
ing practices visible so that prosecutors will be
forced to justify their charges to the public and so
that the public can in turn evaluate the fairness of
these charges. '2 Second, he noted that forcing pros-
ecutors to bring all of their charges initially would
lead them to reach charging decisions without any
knowledge of the particular defendant's willingness
to plead guilty. Thus, Blackmun reasoned, "the
defendant who truly believes himself to be innocent
and wishes for that reason to go to trial, is not
likely to be subject to quite such a devastating
gamble since the prosecutor has fixed the incentives
for the average case." 2 ' Finally, such a policy would
avoid the problem of the defendant's inability to
assess the realistic likelihood that a prosecutor will
in fact be able to procure an indictment which he
threatens.
In a separate dissent, Justice Powell also consid-
ered the issue of whether, practically, the situation
would have been any different had the recidivism
." 434 U.S. at 368-69 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
One might wonder whether in fact the visibility of charg-
ing practices would be enhanced if prosecutors were
forced to bring all of their charges initially. Under the
Court's holding in Bordenkircher, the prosecutor has to
return to the grand jury after the defendant pleads
innocent if he wishes to secure further indictment. It
might be argued that tojustify an increased charge upon
return to the grand jury would subject the prosecutor
and his charging practices to greater public exposure
than had he simply requested the higher charge initially.
The practice of increasing charges would not, as Black-
mun implies, be likely to remain secretly within the
confines of the plea bargaining session.
2' 434 U.S. at 368-69 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Upon close examination, however, the logic of this ar-
gument becomes elusive. The prosecutor who brings his
charges initially, whether or not he fixes them for the
average case, will fix them higher than the prosecutor
who is permitted the option of making increased charges
an element of his plea negotiations. The prosecutor in the
former situation can only bargain down and thus to gain
any bargaining leverage must start high. The prosecutor
in the latter situation, on the other hand, need not set
the stakes as high initially since he retains bargaining
leverage in the form of potential further indictment
throughout negotiations. The defendant in the former
situation thus faces a high risk if he continues to insist on
going to trial in the hopes of eliciting a better deal. Such
risks are largely removed for the defendant in the latter
situation since the parameters of the offer are known to
him. This point will be developed more fully in section
I 1, infra.
charge been brought initially. However, rather
than focussing on the policy issues surrounding
that question, Powell concentrated on the facts of
the particular case and thus identified the crucial
question as whether the prosecutor might reason-
ably have charged Hayes under the Habitual
Criminal Act in the first place. Given the fact that
Hayes' third felony charge was for a relatively
minor offense and given the circumstances sur-
rounding his prior convictions, Powell inferred that
the prosecutor's decision not to initially charge
Hayes under the recidivist statute was a reasonable
and responsible determination that the public in-
terest would not be served by subjecting Hayes to
a potential sentence of life imprisonment. Thus,
Powell accorded great weight to the peculiar facts
of the case, facts which the majority had relegated
to a footnote 22 Powell's approach highlighted the
apparent attempt by the majority to downplay the
glaring injustice of imposing a life sentence on a
man who, despite two prior convictions including
one committed as a teenager, had only forged a
check for $88.30 .2
Powell also noted the majority's failure to char-
acterize the prosecutor's conduct as vindictive.
Thus, he concluded that "[i]n this case, the prose-
cutor's actions denied respondent due process be-
cause their admitted purpose was to discourage
and then to penalize with unique severity his ex-
ercise of constitutional rights."'24
II
To understand fully the Court's distinction be-
tween deterrence from exercising a legal right and
retaliation for the exercise of such a right which is
at the heart of Justice Stewart's opinion, a brief
history of the Court's recent treatment of statutory,
judicial, and prosecutorial encouragement of guilty
pleas is helpful. There are two interwoven strands
to this history. The first consists of a series of cases
in which the Court has explicitly dealt with the
determination of the voluntariness of guilty pleas
22 434 U.S. at 359 n.3.
2J Powell's language captures the unfairness of Hayes'
plight:
Although respondent's prior convictions brought
him within the terms of the Habitual Criminal Act,
the offenses themselves did not result in imprison-
ment; yet the addition of a conviction on a charge
of $88.30 subjected respondent to a mandatory sen-
tende of imprisonment for life. Persons convicted of
rape and murder often are not punished so severely.
Id. at 370 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
24 Id. at 372-73 (Powell, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 69
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in situations in which defendants have chosen to
plead guilty rather than risk the potentially greater
penalties attendant on pursuing their rights at trial.
In 1968, the Court in United States v. Jackson
25
invalidated a death penalty clause in the .Federal
Kidnapping Act,2s which created an offense pun-
ishable by death upon ajury recommendation but
limited to a maximum penalty of life imprisonment
without such a recommendation. The statute set
forth no procedure for imposing the death penalty
on a defendant who either waived the right to jury
trial, or who pleaded guilty,27 but rather, it limited
the death penalty to those defendants who asserted
the right to contest their guilt before a jury.28 The
Court reasoned that the effect of this provision was
"to discourage assertion of the fifth amendment
right not to plead guilty- and to deter exercise of
the sixth amendment right to demand a jury
trial.' ' 9 According to the Court, the provision thus
imposed an impermissible burden on the exercise
of constitutional rights and encouraged guilty pleas
and waivers ofjury trials which in particular cases
might be constitutionally involuntary.30
s 3 9 0 U.S. 570 (1968).
26 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1976).
2 390 U.S. at 571.
m In Jackson, the Curt explained that:
Under the Federal Kidnapping Act, therefore, the
defendant who abandons the right to contest his
guilt before a jury is assured that he cannot be
executed; the defendant ingenuous enough to seek a
jury acquittal stands forwarned that, if thejury finds
him guilty and does not wish to spare his life, he will
die. Our problem is to decide whether the Consti-
tution permits the establishment of such a death
penalty, applicable only to those defendants who
assert the right to contest their guilt before a jury.
Id. at 581.
9 id.
3' In deciding whether a guilty plea meets constitu-
tional standards of voluntariness, courts have tradition-
ally inquired whether it was made "voluntarily" and
"intelligently" with full understanding and appreciation
of the consequences. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
242 (1968); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 801
(1970). However, asJustice Brennan noted in a dissenting
opinion in Parker:
The concept of "voluntariness" contains an ambig-
uous element .... There is some intimation in the
Court's opinions ... that, at least with respect to
guilty pleas, "involuntariness" covers only the narrow
class of cases in which the defendant's will has been
literally overborne. At other points, however, the
Court apparently recognized that the term "invol-
untary" has traditionally been applied to situations
in which an individual, while perfectly capable of
rational choice, has been confronted with factors
that the government may not constitutionally inject
into the decision-making process ... [For examplel
In the ten years since Jackson, the Court's ap-
proach to the determination of the voluntariness of
guilty pleas has evidenced a retreat from the posi-
tion articulated therein, with the effect that the
rationale for the Jackson decision has been signifi-
cantly undercut. In three 1970 cases,3 ' for example,
the Court held that a guilty plea is not involuntary
simply because it is entered into so as to avoid the
risk of a harsher sentence following a finding of
guilt at trial. In each of these cases defendants
entered into pleas of guilty to avoid potential im-
position of death sentences by a jury. Each was
dissuaded from exercising rights to a jury trial and
from pleading not guilty, and thus was discouraged
from asserting rights. In each case, however, the
Court found no constitutional infirmity despite the
claim by each defendant that Jackson compelled a
contrary result.
In Brady v. United States,s3 the Court dealt with a
challenge to the same kidnapping statute at issue
in Jackson.33 In 1959, the defendant Brady was
indicted under that statute before its death penalty
provision had been invalidated by theJackson de-
cision. He initially pleaded not guilty but changed
his plea to guilty upon learning that his codefen-
dant had pleaded guilty and intended to testify
against him. After questioning Brady as to the
voluntariness of his plea, the trial judge imposed
sentence. In 1967, Brady sought post-conviction
relief on theground that the statute, because of its
death penalty provision, operated to coerce his
plea. Relief was denied by both the district court'
and the court of appeals.ss Brady argued in the
Supreme Court that those decisions were inconsist-
ent with the holding in Jackson. The Court disa-
greed and held that Brady's guilty plea was a
"voluntary" and "intelligent" choice among avail-
able alternatives, which was not made invalid even
though it may have been influenced by the fear of
it has long been held that certain promises of leni-
ency or threats of harsh treatment by the trial judge
or the prosecutor unfairly burden or intrude upon
the defendant's decision-making process.
397 U.S. at 801-02 (citing Machibroda v. United States,
368 U.S. 487 (1962)). -
31 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Parker
v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
32 3 9 7 U.S. 742 (1970).
:33 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1976).
'4 After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found
that the plea was voluntary. See Brady v. United States,
404 F.2d 601, 749 (10th Cir. 1969).3'404 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1969), a.Yd 397 U.S. 742
(1970).
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a possible death penalty if the conviction were
obtained.36 The Court distinguishedJackson by not-
ing that the Court there had merely prohibited the
imposition of the death penalty under the kidnap-
ping statute. According to the Court in Brady,
'Jackson ruled neither that all pleas of guilty en-
couraged by the fear of a possible death sentence
are involuntary pleas nor that such encouraged
pleas are invalid whether involuntary or not.'
In Parker v. North Carolina,38 over a vigorous dis-
sent by Justice Brennan, the Court, relying on
Brady, declined to overturn a guilty plea although
it was influenced by a statutory scheme very similar
to the one invalidated in Jackson. In 1964, Parker
was indicted in North Carolina for first-degree
burglary, an offense then punishable by death
unless a plea of guilty was entered, in which case
the punishment was life imprisonment. Thus, as in
Jackson, a defendant could avoid the possibility of
a death penalty on a capital charge by pleading
guilty to the charge. In Parker, the defendant had
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprison-
ment. He sought post-conviction relief claiming
inter alia39 that his guilty plea was involuntary
because it was coerced by the statutory scheme. In
rejecting his claim, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the holding in Brady that an otherwise valid plea is
not made involuntary because it was influenced by
the defendant's desire to avoid the risk of more
severe punishment.40 In dicta the Court noted that
underJackson it might have been unconstitutional
to impose the death penalty for first-degree bur-
glary under the North Carolina scheme,4 but de-
clined to draw from this any implications as to the
validity of Parker's guilty plea and attendant life
sentence.
:' The Court continued:
We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is
compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment
whenever motivated by the defendant's desire to
accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty
rather than face a wider range of possibilities ex-
tending from acquittal to conviction and a higher
penalty authorized by law for the crime charged.
397 U.S. at 751.
37 Id. at 747.
38 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
.9 Parker also argued that his guilty plea was the
product of a coerced confession and that his indictment
was invalid because it was returned by a grand jury from
which members of his race had been systematically ex-
cluded. The Court rejected the first contention, id. at 796,
and declined to consider the second because it had been
rejected by the North Carolina Court of Appeals on an
independent and adequate state procedural ground,
namely that Parker's claim was not timely. Id. at 798.
' Id. at 795.
41 Id. at 794-95.
In North Carolina v. Alford,4 2 again over Justice
Brennan's dissent, the Court went even further and
upheld a plea of guilty which was induced by a
threat to subject the defendant to the risk of death
even where the record demonstrated that the actual
effect of the threat was to induce a guilty plea from
a defendant who continued to claim innocence.
The A/ford Court maintained that when a guilty
plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice
among available alternatives, it is not compelled
within the meaning of the fifth amendment even
if it was entered to avoid the possibility of the
death penalty.4
What emerges from these cases are two incon-
sistent holdings. On the one hand, the Court has
held it unconstitutional for a prosecutor to dis-
courage the right not to plead guilty and the right
to go to trial by exposing to the risk of death only
defendants who exercise those rights. This is the
import of Jackson; but note its implications. Since
the defendant has no option but to plead guilty or
to plead not guilty and go to trial," the effect of
discouraging pleas of not guilty must necessarily be
to encourage pleas of guilty. Thus if it is unconsti-
tutional to discourage pleas of not guilty, logically
it must be equally unconstitutional to encourage
pleas of guilty. But the holdings in Brady, Parker
and A/ford are at variance with the logic of this
argument. Those cases hold that it is not unconsti-
tutional to encourage guilty pleas by exposing to
the risk of death only those defendants who exercise
their rights to plead not guilty and to go to trial.
In light of this apparent logical inconsistency,
one might wonder what policy the Court is imple-
menting in departing from the rationale in Jackson.
Why has the Court in Brady, Parker and A/ford
indicated such seeming unwillingness, despite the
holding in Jackson, to eliminate government im-
posed choices in the criminal process even where
they have the effect of discouraging the exercise of
constitutional rights? 5 The opinion in North Caro-
lina v. A/ford,46 provides some clues as to the source
of this unwillingness. In A/ford, the Court held that
"[an individual accused of crime may voluntarily,
knowingly, and understandingly consent to the
42 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
43Id. at 39.
4 Of course a defendant may plead noto contendere but
the effect of this plea is the same as a guilty plea.
4" Justice Brennan in his dissent in Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970), characterized this devel-
opment as "a design to insulate all guilty pleas from
subsequent attack no matter what influences induced
them." 397 U.S. at 800 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
4" 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
[Vol. 69
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imposition of a prison sentence even if he is un-
willing or unable to admit his participation in the
acts constituting the crime. 4 7 The Court's subse-
quent language indicates that its objective in so
holding was to preserve the availability of choice
for defendants who might conclude that it is in
their interest to avoid the risks of trial. As the Alford
court explained:
Here the State had a strong case of first-degree
murder against Alford. Whether he realized or
disbelieved his guilt, he insisted on his plea because
in his view he had absolutely nothing to gain by a
trial and much to gain by pleading. Because of the
overwhelming evidence against him, a trial was
precisely what neither Alford nor his attorney de-
sired. Confronted with the choice between a trial
for first-degree murder, on the one hand, and a plea
of guilty to second-degree murder, on the other,
Alford quite reasonably chose the latter and thereby
limited the maximum penalty to a 30-year term.
A second reason why the Court may be declining
to invalidate guilty pleas which are encouraged by
government imposed choices is suggested by the
Court in Brady.49 There, the Court stated that:
The more promptly imposed punishment after an
admission of guilt may more effectively attain the
objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance
of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources
are conserved for those cases in which there is a
substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which
there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain
its burden of proof.5
Perhaps it is fair to say that this strand of cases
reflects not, as Brennan would have it, "a design to
insulate all guilty pleas from subsequent attack,"5'
but rather a conscious decision to preserve the
availability of choice for defendants who may bene-
fit from such choice and to conserve scarce trial
resources for cases in which they are most crucial.
Thus while the Court's holdings in this area reflect
logical inconsistencies, there are policy reasons
which may underlie the Court's shift in view and
its seemingly increased willingness to tolerate gov-
ernment efforts to induce guilty pleas.
The trend reflected in the preceding line of cases
raises the question of whether there are any limits
on the degree to which government may act to
induce guilty pleas. It is in the other strand of
47400 U.S. at 37.
4397 US. 742 (1970).
w Id at 752.
51Se note 45 supra.
recent Supreme Court decisions in this area that
the delineation of such limits emerges. These cases
present factual situations in which the defendants,
unlike those in the cases noted above, have refused
to be discouraged in the assertion of their rights
despite the potential risk of increased sentences. As
a consequence they have faced increased charges
or increased sentences and have challenged these
results as violations of due process because they
impose penalties on the exercise of constitutional
rights. The Court's response to these challenges has
been to distinguish between situations in which
actual vindictive motive or the potential for vin-
dictive motive is present and those in which such
potential is minimal, and to find due process viola-
tions only in the former. Thus, in North Carolina v.
Pearce, in which a defendant, following an appeal
and reconviction, was subjected to a greater pun-
ishment than that imposed at his first trial, the
Court held that due process requires that:
[Vjindictiveness against a defendant for having suc-
cessfully attacked his first conviction must play no
part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.
And since the fear of such vindictiveness may un-
constitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the
right to appeal or collaterally attack his first convic-
tion, due process also requires that a defendant be
freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motiva-
tion on the part of the sentencing judge.5'
Accordingly, the Court held that whenever ajudge
imposes a more severe sentence on a defendant
upon retrial, his reasons must affirmatively ap-
pear.5
While the theme of deterrence from exercising
constitutional rights as the source of a due process
violation is clearly present in the Pearce opinion
(following as it did only one year afterJackson), it
is the element of retaliation that the Court contin-
ued to find offensive to due process. Thus in Colton
v. Kentucky,55, the Court declined to extend the
holding in Pearce to Kentucky's two-tiered criminal
justice system which allows a misdemeanor defend-
ant convicted in an inferior trial court to seek
retrial de novo in a court of general jurisdiction. In
Colton, the Court upheld the imposition of increased
sentences at the second trial. In distinguishing
Pearce, the Colton Court noted that since the Ken-
tucky procedure involves a completely new deter-
mination of guilt or innocence by a different court
than is involved in the initial trial, there is no
2395 U.S. 711 (1969).
"'Id at 725.
" ' at 726.
"407 U.S. 104 (1972).
1978]
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motive to deal more strictly with a de novo defendant
than with any other defendant and thus the poten-
tial for personal vindictiveness is absent.-" In Chaffin
v. Stynchcombe,57 the Court adopted a similar ration-
ale in upholding the imposition of a higher sen-
tence on retrial by a jury which is uninformed as
to the earlier sentence. The Chaffin Court reasoned
that the likelihood that a jury would impose an
increased sentence out of vindictiveness was mini-
mal.
In Blackledge v. Perry,ss the holding in Pearce was
made applicable to prosecutors. Thus, the Court
held that it is a violation of due process for a state
to initiate more serious charges than initially
brought against a defendant upon that defendant's
invocation of a statutory right to appeal. The focus
on the potential for vindictiveness is clear from the
Court's language:
A prosecutor clearly has a considerable stake in
discouraging convicted misdemeanants from ap-
pealing and thus obtaining a 'trial de novo in the
Superior Court, since such an appeal will clearly
require increased expenditures of prosecutorial re-
sources before the defendant's conviction becomes
final, and may even result in a formerly convicted
defendant's going free. And, if the prosecutor has
the means readily at hand to discourage such ap-
peals-by "upping the ante" through a felony in-
dictment whenever a convicted misdemeanant pur-
sues his statutory appellate remedy-the State can
insure that only the most hardy defendants will
brave the hazards of a de novo trial.59
The principle that emerges from this second
strand of cases is that where the exercise of a
constitutional right is penalized by actual vindic-
tiveness or is threatened by a realistic likelihood of
vindictiveness, the potential for deterring future
exercises of such rights reaches a constitutionally
impermissible level. The distinction, then, between
the Brady-Parker-A/ford strand of cases and the
Pearce-Colton-Chaffin-Perry strand lies in the absence
of vindictiveness in the former which prevents the
deterrent effect from rising to the level of consti-
tutional violation.'
56 Id. at 116-17.
57 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
rs 4 1 7 U.S. 21 (1974).
5 Id. at 27-28.
6" As Justice Brennan has argued in dissent in Parker,
397 U.S. at 799, and Alford, 400 U.S. at 39, the distinction
between deterrence of the exercise of constitutional rights
and retaliation for their exercise is not without problems.
For example, the anomalous result of this pattern of
decisions is that those defendants who resist the pressure
III
The decision in Bordenkircher v. Hayes represents
a significant departure from this state of the law.
While Justice Stewart refused to recognize the
prosecutor's conduct in Bordenkircher as vindictive,
vindictiveness was present in Bordenkircher to the
same degree as it was thought to be in Pearce6 and
in Perry.62 In Bordenkircher, the prosecutor admitted
that his intent in threatening further indictment
was to discourage the defendant from exercising
ht right to trial.3 In Bordenkircher, just as in Perry,
the prosecutor sought to discourage the exercise of
constittiofial rights by "upping the ante" through
a more serious indictment. That the Court now
chooses to ctaracterize this conduct as a natural
and legitimate consequence of the prosecutor's in-
terest at the bargaining table signals a narrowing
of the broad language in Pearce and in Perry. Those
cases can no longer be viewed as standing for the
proposition that where the exercise of a constitu-
tional right is threatened by vindictive retaliation
a due process violation lies. Rather, their impact
has been limited to their facts such that vindictive-
ness is only constitutionally impermissible when it
is attendant on the exercise of a defendant's legal
right to attack his original conviction.
One might wonder why it makes sense to distin-
guish between vindictiveness in the context of an
appeal and vindictiveness for the exercise of other
legal rights;' the potential for deterring the exer-
to plead guilty are likely to receive relief where such a
choice subjects them to more severe punishment because
the Court will likely view that result as a product of
judicial, or prosecutorial, vindictiveness or of statutory
discouragement of the exercise of trial rights as in United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). On the other
hand, those defendants who succumb to the same pres-
sure and are induced to surrender their constitutional
rights are left without any remedy at all. See Parker v.
North Carolina, 397 U.S. at 807 (Brennan,J. dissenting).
Bordenkircher may have altered this result at least in the
context of plea bargaining so that both types of defend-
ants are left in an equally unenviable position.
61395 U.S. 711 (1969).
62417 U.S. 21 (1974).
63 434 U.S. at 358 n.1; Id. at 361 n.7.
64 Indeed Blackmun in his Bordenkircher dissent levels
this criticism against the majority:
Prosecutorial vindictiveness, it seems to me, in the
present narrow context, is the fact against which the
Due Process Clause ought to protect. I perceive little
difference between vindictiveness after what the
Court describes, .. as the exercise of a "'legal right
to attack his original conviction," and vindictiveness
in the "give-and-take negotiation common in plea
bargaining."
434 U.S. at 367-68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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cise of such rights would seem to be the same in
either case. The Court's answer is to point to the
plea bargaining situation and to say, in effect, that
in that context, the concept of vindictiveness does
not exist. This is a difficult conclusion to accept.
To characterize the prosecutor's conduct in Borden-
kircher as anything but vindictive is at best coun-
terintuitive. Yet, a careful examination of the con-
sequences for the defendant of not allowing prose-
cutors to use the leverage of further indictments to
elicit guilty pleas suggests a reason for the Court's
position.
The viability of plea bargaining depends on the
assumption that it is mutually advantageous for
defendant and prosecutor to avoid going to trial.65
Each is willing to make certain concessions to avoid
that outcome. The defendant's bargaining power
derives from the prosecutor's desire to avoid the
costs of trial and perhaps also the risks of losing the
case if his evidence is less than conclusive. The
degree of leverage a defendant in any particular
case has is fixed. Nothing he does will diminish or
enhance it. The prosecutor's bargaining power, on
the other hand, is determined by several factors,
the most important of which is the degree of risk
which he makes attendant on going to trial and
thus on the charge under which he secures an
indictment. To induce a defendant to plead guilty,
the prosecutor must be able to offer a sufficiently
reduced penalty to make the risks of trial seem too
great. The prosecutor can enhance, his leverage by
increasing the differential between the charge un-
der which he secures the indictment and the bar-
gain he is ultimately willing to strike. Bordenkircher
raises the question of whether he must make his
decision as to the "stakes" before the plea bargain-
ing session begins and thus fix his bargaining lev-
erage initially or whether he can preserve some
flexibility until he sees how determined the defend-
ant is to go to trial. As noted earlier, 6 Justice
Blackmun argued that the choice should be made
initially. Yet it may be that the defendant in fact
fares better if the prosecutor can preserve the op-
tion of increasing the charges after plea negotia-
tions.
If the prosecutor is forced to make his charging
commitment initially, he will overcharge so as to
preserve leverage in plea negotiations. Under such
circumstances, the defendant who wishes to avoid
trial must make his decision as to whether or not
to accept the prosecutor's offer based on a guess as
6
'
5 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 752.
66 See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
to whether the offer is or is not the best one he will
get. Is the prosecutor bluffing or is he truly unwill-
ing to make further concessions to avoid trial? The
defendant is faced with the choice of accepting an
offer which may or may not be the best one he can
get, or insisting on going to trial in the hopes that
the prosecutor will offer greater leniency. But here
the stakes of guessing wrong are high. The defend-
ant, knowing that if he holds out for a better offer
and it is not forthcoming he will face serious
charges at trial, will probably accept a less advan-
tageous offer than the defendant for whom the
costs of being mistaken are less great. Thus because
of the high initial stakes, the defendant is likely to
end up with less than the best offer the prosecutor
was willing to make.
Consider, on the other hand, the situation in
which the prosecutor's leverage continues through-
out the bargaining session in the form of the avail-
ability of further indictment. Here the prosecutor
need not overcharge initially. Most likely his initial
charge will be somewhere between the charge he
would have made if further indictments were pre-
cluded and the lowest offer he is willing to make.
Much of the uncertainty as to whether the defend-
ant has the best offer he will get is therefore re-
moved. Because the prosecutor has not heavily
overcharged initially, his bottom line is most likely
set or at least approached in his initial offer. It is
unlikely that he will make many additional conces-
sions. Instead, the defendant's uncertainty is as to
whether the prosecutor will indeed seek, or will be
able to secure, the further indictments he threatens
if the defendant insists on trial. Thus, the defend-
ant is faced with accepting what he knows is prob-
ably the best offer he will get or risking trial on a
charge which is at worst the one the prosecutor has
threatened but which is potentially less severe if
the prosecutor was bluffing and either cannot or
does not wish to secure the indictment he
threatened. In this case, then, the boundaries of the
deal are known to the defendant. He need not
guess as to whether the prosecutor will bargain
further. If he chooses to plead guilty he can rest
fairly sure that the offer was the best he could get.
If he insists on trial, at worst the situation is no
different than if the prosecutor had overcharged
initially, and, in many instances, he may be better
off.
Viewed in this context, it does not make sense to
characterize the prosecutor who threatens further
indictment during plea negotiations as vindictive.
He is simply exercising an alternate form of lever-
age. In order for the concept of plea bargaining to
PLEA BARGAINING
work, both parties must have something with
which to bargain. The prosecutor's leverage derives
either from an initial overcharge or from the avail-
ability of making the threat of increased charges
an element of his plea negotiations. The above
discussion suggests that the defendant is no worse
off and may in fact be better off if the second form
of leverage is available. On close analysis, then, the
potential for deterring the exercise of trial rights is
no greater and may even be reduced if the prose-
cutor is free to threaten further indictments during
plea negotiations.
In light of this analysis, the rationale for the
Court's decision in Bordenkircher becomes more un-
derstandable. Rather than reflecting a "design to
insulate all guilty pleas from subsequent attack no
matter what influences induced them," 67 Borden-
kircher can be viewed as an extension of the salutory
policies enunciated in Brady,68 Parkero and Alford.70
It is a decision which furthers the advantages of
plea bargaining by preserving the availability of
choice for defendants who view such choice as
advantageous. It is also a decision which conserves
scarce trial resources for cases in which they are
most crucial, without the costs to defendants in the
form of deterrence of the exercise of constitutional
rights that existed in Pearce7I and in Perry.72 While
there is some deterrence of the exercise of the right
to trial, it is no greater than that which was found
permissible in Brady, Parker and Afford.
The impact of Bordenkircher is thus not easily
evaluated. While it signals the expansion of the
prosecutor's legitimate leverage in the plea bar-
gaining situation by holding that he is free to use
threats of further indictment to elicit guilty pleas,
the above analysis suggests that we are not likely
to see a resultant increase in guilty pleas. On the
67 See note 45 supra.
68 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
6' 397 U.S. 790 (1970).70 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
71 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
72417 U.S. 21 (1974).
contrary, the analysis suggests that while the num-
ber of guilty pleas will remain constant, where such
pleas are entered, on the average, they will be for
lower charges than had threats of further indict-
ment been precluded. If this interpretation is cor-
rect then it is not the decision in Bordenkircher for
which the Court is to be faulted. Rather the Court
should be faulted for the rationale it articulates
which leaves the impression that the decision is a
thinly veiled attempt to further weight the balance
of power at the bargaining table in favor of the
prosecutor.
CONCLUSION
It is only recently that the Court has recognized
and accepted as legitimate the institution of plea
bargaining as an element of the criminal process.
Until Bordenkircher, the Court's few rulings on the
issue have been directed at introducing safeguards
into the plea bargaining situation. Thus the Court
has held that a prosecutor's plea bargain promise
must be kept, 73 has recognized the need for a public
record indicating that a plea was knowingly and
voluntarily made,74 and has recognized the impor-
tance of counsel during plea negotiations.75 While
Bordenkircher does not undercut these safeguards, it
would be regrettable if it signalled the end of this
trend. If the Court were to move toward weighing
the balance of power at the negotiating table in
favor of the prosecutor, the long run effect would
be to undercut the value to defendants of the
carefully evolved safeguards for their protection
which exist in other aspects of the criminal justice
system. This is a development to be anticipated
and avoided. In this newly developing area, it is
likely that future cases will see the delineation of
limits on the prosecutor's legitimate use of leverage
in the plea bargaining situation.
73 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
74 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
75 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 758.
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